

Approved For Release 2001/11/19 : CIA-RDP78-06207A000100020002-3

23 JUN 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Interim Report on Investigation of Intelligence Coverage
at Senior Service Colleges

REFERENCE : Memo to Ex Dir-Compt fm A/DTR, subj.: Intelligence
Coverage at Senior Service Colleges, dtd 23 Jun 72

1. This is a preliminary report on our investigation of coverage of national intelligence at Senior Service Colleges. By the end of August, all CY '71-'72 CIA students at the Colleges will have returned to Agency assignments, and we will be able to get a more up-to-date picture of national intelligence coverage in the individual College programs, and perhaps also of plans for changes during the coming year. The memorandum from Gen. Bennett to the commandants of the College (see Attachment A), which is similar in content to the memorandum sent by DIA to its students at these Colleges, caused some discussion and perhaps some rethinking of this issue. As a result, at least some Colleges plan a few changes in coverage in the coming school year. We should be able to submit a final report by 15 September.

2. Do the Colleges have adequate coverage of national intelligence?

a. We are trying to determine the type and extent of coverage of national intelligence by studying each College's program, and by interviewing Agency graduates from each College. Each College has its own method of organizing its year's program, as demonstrated by Attachment B, which shows program elements for three of the Colleges. Within these programs intelligence might be covered as an input to policy-making (as in a talk by Dr. Kissinger, and in a panel discussion by NSC staff members, at ICAT), or it might be covered in specific talks on national intelligence (as by Lyman Kirkpatrick at the Naval War College), or in talks and seminars on specific world areas by intelligence specialists (this appears to be a common element in all of the Colleges).

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b. Some of the Colleges do not feel there is a problem, but feel that their coverage of intelligence is sufficient. Some reasons they give for this are:

(1) All of the military officers have attended Staff and Command Schools in which there was ample coverage of intelligence (even though they may not provide extensive coverage of national intelligence).

(2) Coverage of intelligence must be viewed in relationship to other subjects in the College's program. To a CIA student anything but detailed coverage of intelligence would appear inadequate, but to the majority of students (who are not intelligence specialists) there seems no reason for giving undue attention to intelligence any more than there is to such important subjects as communications. A recent Naval War College graduate said that the present level of coverage of intelligence at his College represents a considerable reduction from the past when coverage of intelligence was more detailed and students in their critiques stated that it should be cut back.

c. In each case consideration must be given to the objectives of the individual College program, although in general their prime objective appears to be similar: to enhance the development of policy makers and operational decision-makers.

d. The responses to Gen. Bennett's memo by ICAF and Naval War College were politely negative in stating that they did not want DIA's active assistance in planning and presenting intelligence, other than specifically invited speakers, and inputs by DIA students at the Colleges.

3. Following are a number of procedures for exploring this subject further, some of which are already being pursued, at least in part. It may be desirable for us to attempt a number of these which we are not now actively pursuing.

1) Encourage commandents to expand coverage of national intelligence, and to draw on CIA speakers for this coverage. This could be done through one or more of the following:

a) Send an official letter, seconding the statements by Gen. Bennett, but focusing particularly on national intelligence, and reiterating our desire to provide carefully selected, competent, and persuasive speakers on appropriate topics. Also encourage the Colleges to draw on the expertise of CIA students and (in the case of National War College) the CIA faculty member.

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b) Invite each of the commandants to meet with CIA's top managers, to determine from them how they cover national intelligence and to assure them of our willingness to provide assistance in every way possible. We will discuss the advisability of this and other approaches with [REDACTED] when he returns from vacation, and with [REDACTED] when he returns from Naval War College.

c) One or more of CIA's top managers could visit each commandant, for the same purpose.

d) Draw up a proposed curriculum on national intelligence, jointly with DIA and INR (either done by, or with representation from, the schools: OTR, DIS, and FSI). We feel this approach is unlikely to be successful. Our representative at DIS, for example, feels that it would meet with the same negative response that Gen. Bennett's memo received, and that the commandants would feel it was unnecessary interference in their affairs.

2) Provide a series of publications to fill gaps in reading material:

a) Produce a series of bibliographies on national intelligence topics, along the lines of the one on the role of the DCI and CIA which OTR prepared for [REDACTED] at National War College. In this bibliography we included a separate section of readings that include varying amounts of criticism and false information about the DCI and CIA, because some students, who are aware of these items, will wonder about their exclusion. STATINTL

b) Produce a series of pamphlets dealing with topics related to national intelligence. These pamphlets could be produced by OTR, and could be based in part on talks given at the Colleges by CIA speakers (some of the Colleges tape the talks, transcribe them, and file the transcripts for use by students and faculty). OTR could coordinate the drafts with appropriate offices in Headquarters. It would be necessary to update these pamphlets periodically.


c) Inform the Colleges of the existence and availability of training materials in OTR and provide copies in response to their request. OTR produced a series of manuals (some now out of date), consisting in large part of reprints of articles in Studies in Intelligence, on NIE production, economic intelligence, current intelligence, and scientific and technical intelligence. It has also published "Presidents of the US on Intelligence," and smaller training manuals on such subjects as warning and indications intelligence. These are all available in quantity for use by the Colleges.

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3) Encourage greater use of the intelligence expertise of CIA students. Most of our students report that their expertise is utilized either formally or informally. Some have brought Agency speakers to their College to deal with subjects not covered in the College program. However, it is almost impossible for students to introduce any major changes. The decision on the content of College programs is made by the commandants and their curriculum advisors in the period between programs, and once the program has been printed it is almost unchangeable.

4) If necessary, consider reintroducing CIA Faculty members into the Colleges, to assist in planning the programs, and to provide or arrange for lectures and seminar sessions on national intelligence and related intelligence topics.

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HUGH T. CUNNINGHAM
Director of Training

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



5 JUN 1972

U-1767/DE-1B

SUBJECT: Intelligence Coverage at Senior Service Colleges

TO: Commandant, The National War College
Commandant, Industrial College of the Armed Forces
President, Naval War College
Commandant, Air War College

1. In a recent meeting with the Commandant of the Army War College, the subject of ways in which the Defense Intelligence Agency can better serve the Army War College was discussed. It was the consensus that the average student attending the Army War College has a general awareness of the subject of intelligence, however, he does not know the capability and limitations of national agencies available to assist him in decision making in higher staff and senior commands.

2. In view of this, I am reviewing the intelligence support provided all of the senior service colleges with an interest in having the Defense Intelligence Agency provide in greater depth to senior service college students a knowledge of the intelligence support available at the Department of Defense and national level for use in decision making.

3. To assist in this review, I would like to determine:

a. How the Defense Intelligence Agency can best assist in raising the level of understanding of students at your college concerning the impact of intelligence on national security problems and decisions?

b. The number of hours and the type of instructions currently in your curricula devoted toward increasing the students' awareness of intelligence support available.

5 JUN 1972

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c. Whether there is an intelligence officer assigned to the staff and faculty of your college.

4. Your comments in response to the questions listed above will appreciably assist the Defense Intelligence Agency in its planning. Responses would be appreciated by 16 June 1972. The DIA point of contact is LTC Robert B. Burke, DIA (DP-1B), telephone no. OX 56660 or OX 56690.



D. V. BENNETT
Lieutenant General, USA
Director

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ATTACHMENT B

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Quarter

- 1 Fundamentals of Strategy (economics, sociology, history, international relations, military strategy, management, international law)
- 2 National Strategies (US policy toward individual world areas, done by committees)
- 3 Maritime Strategy
- 4 Military Strategy (other than Naval, done by committees)

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

Topic No.

- 1 The Current International Environment
- 2 The Nature of International Relations
- 3 Historical Development of US Foreign Policy
- 4 The United States and the International Economy
- 5 Vital National Security Interests and Objectives of the United States
- 6 Major US Interests and Objectives in Europe, Including the USSR
- 7 Major US Interests and Objectives in East Asia
- 8 Major US Interests and Objectives in Latin America
- 9 Major US Interests and Objectives in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia
- 10 Key National Security Issues Confronting the United States

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Core Program

- 410 Environment of National Security
- 420 Foundations of National Security
- 430 US Industry and National Security
- 440 International Security Problems and Policies
- 450 National Economic Problems and Policies
- 460 Management in Department of Defense
- 470 National Security Management in Perspective

Foundation Program

- Management
- Economics
- Scientific Decisionmaking

Elective Program

Supplementary Studies/Research Program

Workshop Program

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DTR-7657

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DD/S 72-2527

Executive Registry

72-34521

23 JUN 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

THROUGH

: Deputy Director for Support

30 JUN 1972

SUBJECT

: Intelligence Coverage at Senior
Service Colleges

STATINTL

REFERENCE

: Memo to DTR fm [REDACTED] dtd
16 Jun 72, subj.: Comments on the National
War College, 1971-72 Academic Year

1. In connection with the assignment you have given us to produce a "package" on the Agency and the production of national intelligence that may be used to inform Senior Service College audiences, I think you will find the attached memorandum from DIA dated 25 May 1972, subject: Intelligence Coverage at Senior Service Colleges, from Robert B. Burke, LTC, USA, Policy Branch, of interest. This memo was provided us by an Agency war college student. It is apparent that the matter of intelligence coverage is presently of general concern to DIA and the war colleges.

2. I find the question raised in paragraph 3b most interesting and have a feeling that this matter was perhaps already under consideration at the time that I spoke to General Franklin Davis at the Army War College at your request on 17 March 1972 regarding the matter of our continued representation there. The alacrity with which they accepted the discontinuance of representation and our recommendation for a different type of support gave me to believe then that it "was very close to precisely what they wanted."

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[REDACTED]
Acting Director of Training

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8 MAY 1972

U-1770/DP-1B

SUBJECT: Intelligence Coverage at Senior Service Colleges

TO: Mr. James Agersborg, National War College
Mr. Leroy Sexton, Jr., Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Mr. William Thewes, Naval War College
Mr. Thomas Donahue, (DI-5), Army War College (Graduate)
Mr. Edward Lipp, (DI-3), Air War College (Graduate)

1. LTC Bennett, Director, DIA, and MG Franklin Davis, Commandant of the U. S. Army War College, in recent correspondence discussed the possible need for greater depth in intelligence coverage at the Army War College. LTC Bennett, in his tasking, has directed that we explore this problem at each of the senior staff colleges.

2. General Bennett and General Davis feel that the average student has a general awareness of the subject of intelligence, however, he does not know the capability and limitations of national agencies to assist him in decision making in higher staff levels and senior commands.


3. General Bennett has posed the following questions:

a. How do you raise the level of understanding of the average officer concerning the impact of intelligence on national security problems and decisions?

b. Should there be an intelligence officer in residence at each senior service college?

4. As members of DIA who are currently attending or who attended the 1970-71 sessions at the senior service colleges, your comments are solicited in assisting in the preparation of proposals. Request that you review the curriculum from the viewpoint of an intelligence officer and make proposals on how the level of understanding regarding the impact of intelligence on national security problems and decisions in your respective colleges can be raised.

5. Your comments would be appreciated by 31 May 1972. The DIA action officer is LTC Robert B. Burke, USA, DP-1B, extension 56669 or 56690.


ROBERT B. BURKE
LTC, USA

16 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT: Comments on the National War College,
1971-1972 Academic Year

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1. Introduction: I was one of two DDP students at the National War College (NWC) [REDACTED] I had requested to be sent to the NWC principally because I wanted to obtain a more profound understanding of our military and the way it works, and secondarily because I wanted to improve my overall intellectual background with particular emphasis on the Soviet Union and its European/Asian interests.

2. Value of Course: In this section I will emphasize negative reactions to the course because in previous evaluations the positive side, in my view, has been exaggerated. My overall conclusion was that the course was beneficial, hence my negative comments must be placed in this perspective. These criticisms have been given directly to the staff of the NWC framed in suitable polite language. In this internal document, I'll be more direct.

3. The course curriculum has become ritualized into a daily system which has often become redundant and unchallenging. For instance, the discussion periods degenerate frequently into exchanges of subjective opinion without factual back-up and without suitable direction from the faculty present. The NWC ambience is not conducive to genuine intellectual exchange and the barracks technique of mob psychology often takes over the forum. The course needs to adopt more stimulating and professional techniques for student participation such as debate, critique and more intensive and well thought out political and military simulations. The standards have dropped in part

because the faculty is by and large mediocre, particularly the military component. This is compounded by what I believe to be a second-rate contribution from academia. On the other hand, our own representation on the faculty has been excellent.- which should be a source of pride to us.

4. Meeting and cultivating one's colleagues in other components of the United States Government is no doubt important, but has been overemphasized. In the past it has often been used as a weak rationalization for falling standards of excellence. There is no doubt that the NWC has as students some extraordinary military officers and locating them among the mass and exchanging views with these men was a valuable experience. They were unfortunately at times muted by others of their less talented colleagues who represented the more undesirable aspects of the military man. The faculty did little to control this situation.

5. Intelligence problems are not well understood at the NWC. (The NWC simplistically explains the use of intelligence by a "monopoly" type game in which intelligence is purchased.) A briefing such as is provided on the structure and functions of the intelligence establishment tends to be bureaucratic and superficial. In summary, the use of intelligence on the national scene and by theater commanders and embassies is not adequately dealt with.

7. Recommendations:

- a. Careful consideration of the pluses and minuses should be made before sending a DDP officer

in a sensitive status to the National War College. Perhaps the DDP input should be limited to one officer who is relatively well known and also well qualified.

b. CIA initiate discussions with the NWC on improving the education of the students on the importance, limitations and use of intelligence.

c. CIA cooperate with the NWC in sending its best officers to participate in geographical area briefings for students and also participate actively in war games and strategic problems designed by the NWC.

d. CIA provide the NWC such classified information as necessary to make the study of strategic problems worthwhile and realistic (in this context CIA's role in Laos is profoundly misunderstood by almost all of the military officers in this class and by the faculty as well). I tried to correct some of the more flagrant misunderstandings but I believe it preferable that part of the overall curriculum be devoted to understanding these complex and subtle problems of American commitment.

8. George Washington University Program: I participated in this program and am glad I did so. It unquestionably detracts from the NWC course but provides a discipline in reading and research and in student participation not otherwise emphasized in the course. The importance of the GWU program could be diminished by a more comprehensive and challenging NWC curriculum. Until this is done, I would recommend the GWU program to those not already possessing an advanced degree.

9. Summary: I reiterate that it was a privilege and honor to be sent to the National War College. There is much that is good in the course. The faculty is already engaged in a program to improve the curriculum and the Board of Consultants is aware of the need for change. The NWC does currently accept the view that the individual student should be allowed to indulge his own interests during that rare year of separation from the rigors of an active career. I tend to believe rather

that the course should be more dynamic and should be aimed toward transmitting significant experience and to training future executives of the United States Government. Anything less than this would not keep pace with the times.

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